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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of the diﬀusion of a General Purpose
Technology (GPT), that spreads ﬁrst within the developed country of
its origin (North), and then to a developing country (South). We use a
general equilibrium model of growth, where each ﬁnal good is produced
by one of two available technologies. Each technology is characterized
by a speciﬁc set of intermediate goods complemented by speciﬁc labor.
The quality of intermediate goods is enhanced periodically by Schum-
peterian R&D. When quality reaches a threshold level, a GPT arises
in one of the technologies and spreads ﬁrst to the other one, within the
North. Then, it propagates to the South, following a similar sequence.
Since diﬀusion is not even, neither intra nor inter-country, the GPT
produces successive changes in the direction of technological knowledge
and in inter and intra-country wage inequality.
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11 Introduction
Innovations of the general purpose technology (GPT) type — deﬁned as in-
novations that have large, extensive and prolonged impacts on the economy,
such as steam-engine, electricity and computers — typically take a long time
to have a signiﬁcant impact in the aggregate economy, as David (1990) doc-
uments for industrialized countries. Arguably, it takes even longer for the
GPT to spread to developing countries, due to lower levels of technological
knowledge. Therefore, this is certainly a case in which the process of GPT
diﬀusion (transitional dynamics) is at least as relevant as its steady-state
eﬀects. In particular, wage inequality eﬀects of technological change — that
have been receiving ample analytical attention by authors such as Acemoglu
(2002) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) — generated throughout the
long process are likely to play an important role in the GPT diﬀusion.
Major contributions to the literature on GPT using general equilibrium
models (e.g., Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,1995, and Helpman and Trajten-
berg, 1998) have not dealt neither with international diﬀusion nor with
wage inequality consequences, since they typically consider a closed-economy
f r a m e w o r kw i t has i m p l i ﬁed productive structure with a single aggregate
good and homogeneous labor. This paper extends the scope of the analy-
sis by studying the wage-inequality eﬀects of the diﬀusion of a GPT that
spreads ﬁrst within the developed country of its origin (North), and then to
a developing country (South).
We use a general equilibrium model of Schumpeterian R&D with ﬁnal
goods produced by speciﬁc technologies. Each technology is characterized
by a speciﬁc set of intermediate goods complemented by speciﬁc labor. The
quality of intermediate goods is enhanced periodically in the North by inno-
vations. When quality reaches a threshold level, a GPT arises in one of the
technologies and spreads ﬁrst to the others, within the North. Then, it prop-
agates to the South, following a similar sequence. Diﬀusion to the South, in
the context of international trade of intermediate goods, is achieved through
imitative R&D.
In our framework the distinctive characteristic of the GPT innovation is
its capacity of raising not only the quality of the particular good in which it
has been generated, but also, in successive phases of the diﬀusion process,
aggregate productivity. In this sense, the GPT works like an institutional
2improvement that permanently increases productivity. The role of institu-
tional change in explaining changes in wage inequality has been recently
stressed by Aghion et al. (2003). Thus, the analysis of the wage-inequality
eﬀects of the GPT, as deﬁned in our framework, links the institutional ex-
planation to the more common ones (see also Aghion et al., 2003) related
to international trade and to technological change.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the economic struc-
ture and the resulting international general equilibrium. Section 3 focus,
ﬁrst, on the deﬁnition of the GPT and of its diﬀusion process and, then,
simulates its implications for the path of intra and inter-country wage in-
equality. Some preliminary concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
2 Economic structure
Each economy produces ﬁnal goods in perfect competition and intermediate
goods under monopolistic competition. R&D activities, when successful,
results in innovations (in the North) and imitations (in the South) that
are used by the intermediate-goods sector, as in Romer (1990). Labor and
quality-adjusted intermediate goods are the inputs of ﬁnal goods. The frac-
tion of the aggregate ﬁn a lg o o dt h a ti sn o tc o n s u m e di s ,i nt u r n ,u s e di nt h e
production of intermediate goods and in R&D.
2.1 Domestic product and factor markets
Following Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), each ﬁnal good — indexed by n
∈ [0,1] — is produced by one of two technologies. Low (High)-technology
combines low (high)-skilled labor, L (H), with Low (High)-speciﬁci n t e r m e -
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α if n > n(t)
,
(1)
A is the level of aggregate productivity, determined by the country’s do-
mestic institutions (exogenously) and by the state of general-purpose tech-
nology (endogenously). We assume that AS <A N (S and N for South and
3North, respectively) is the only North-South diﬀerence in the parameters of
the production function.
The integral terms are the contributions of quality-adjusted intermediate
goods: x is the quantity, q>1 is the (exogenous) size of each quality
improvement, k(j,t) is the current quality rung in intermediate good j,a n d
(1−α) is the aggregate intermediate-goods input share. In turn, α ∈ ]0,1[ is
the labor share and h>1 is an absolute advantage of high over low-skilled
labor; and the terms n and (1 − n) imply that L( H )has a comparative
advantage in producing ﬁnal goods indexed by small (large) ns.
This production function combines complementarity between inputs with
substitutability between the two technologies. The optimal choice of technol-
ogy is reﬂected in the equilibrium threshold ﬁnal good n, which results from
proﬁt maximization (by perfectly competitive ﬁnal-goods producers and by
intermediate-goods monopolists) and full-employment equilibrium in factor






















α ] dj (3)
are aggregate quality indexes of the stocks of technological knowledge. The
ratio
QH
QL is an appropriate measure of the technological-knowledge bias.
The threshold n can be implicitly expressed in terms of price indexes.
Deﬁning the aggregate ﬁnal good as the numeraire and pL and pH as the









Full-employment in the labor market, implicit in n, yields the following














4where wm is the wage per unit of m-type labor, m = H,L.
Together, equations (2), (4) and 5 are useful in foreseeing the operation
of the price channel from the stocks (of labor and technological knowledge)
to the ﬂows of resources used in R&D and to wage inequality. For example,
in a country relatively H-abundant and (or) with a large technological-
knowledge bias, n is small, i.e., many ﬁnal goods are produced with the
High technology and sold at a relatively low price. Proﬁt opportunities in
the production of intermediate-goods used by the relatively high-priced Low
technology ﬁnal goods induce a change in the direction of R&D against the
technological-knowledge bias and in favor of low-skilled wages.
2.2 R&D
The results of successful R&D are innovations in the North and imitations
in the South, owned and protected domestically, which improve the qual-
ity of intermediate goods and the stocks of technological knowledge, while
creatively destroying the proﬁts from previous improvements (Aghion and
Howitt, 1992).
The probabilities of successful R&D are, in the North and South, respec-
tively,
pbN(k,j,t)=yN(j,t) · βN q(α−1)α−1k(j,t) · mN(t)−ξ (6)
and
pbS(k,j,t)=yS(j,t)·βS q(α−1)α−1k(j,t) e Q(t)·mS(t)−ξ · e Qm(t)−σ+e Qm(t),( 7 )
where
(i) yi(j,t), i = N,S,i st h eﬂow of country i’s ﬁnal-good resources devoted
to R&D in intermediate good j;
(ii) βN q(α−1)α−1k(j,t), βN > 0, is the North’s net cost of the increas-
ing complexity of quality improvements (net of the the positive eﬀect of
accumulated public knowledge), as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch.
7); because the levels of accumulated public knowledge are diﬀerent, this
net cost in the South is adjusted by the relative m-speciﬁc technological
knowledge of the South, deﬁned as e Qm(t) ≡
Qm,S(t)
Qm(t) ∈ ]0,1[; in addition,




i , m = L,H and ξ>0,i st h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of market size,
measured by the relevant labor, assuming, as suggested by Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (1999), that the costs of introducing new quality intermediate
goods and replacing old ones are proportional to the size of the market.
(iv) e Qm(t)−σ+ e Qm(t), σ>0, is a catching-up function, reﬂecting a de-
creasing advantage of technological-knowledge backwardness, as in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1997); the size of σ aﬀects how quickly the advantage of
backwardness decreases with e Qm.
2.3 International trade and limit pricing of intermediate goods
We consider that the North and South freely trade intermediate goods only,
while ﬁnal goods and the other factors of production are internationally im-
mobile. Resulting either directly from the latest innovation or indirectly
through cheaper imitation of the latest innovation, internationally traded
intermediate goods embody the state-of-the-art technological knowledge ac-
cumulated in the North, Qm. This is the technological knowledge available to
Southern producers of intermediate goods, which is higher than the South’s
domestic technological knowledge, Qm,S, because at each point in time not
all innovations have been imitated yet.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 12), we assume that limit
pricing by each leading monopolist is optimal. And, in order to generate
production and exports of some intermediate goods by the South, we assume
that the marginal cost of producing ﬁnal goods is lower in the South. As the
aggregate ﬁnal good is the input to the production of intermediate goods,
the marginal cost advantage implies that when producing in the same quality
rung, a Southern producer is able to underprice its Northern competitor.
The dynamics of competitive advantage in each intermediate good de-
pends crucially on the dynamics of innovations and imitations and thus it is
endogenous. Figure 1 illustrates a possible path of the technological knowl-
edge in an intermediate good. At ta a Northern producer innovates, captur-
ing the entire international market until tb, when another Northern producer
innovates and steals the entire business. At tc a Southern producer imitates
successfully, stealing, in turn, the entire business (due to the marginal cost
advantage prevailing in the South) until the next innovation occurs at td.I n
this particular intermediate good, between tc and td the South’s domestic
technological knowledge equals the technological knowledge internationally
6available; while between ta and tc and after td it is smaller.
Due to the diﬀerent levels of productivity, international immobility of
labor and the limited substitutability between the two types of labor (owing
to the complementarity with sets of intermediate goods), international trade
is not suﬃcient to equalize wages neither intra nor inter the North and South.
As for intra-country diﬀerences in wages, equation (5) applied to the
North and South with trade of intermediate goods shows that relative wages














































Wages are lower in the South if, as assumed, AS <A N and diﬀerences in
prices of ﬁnal goods are of second order.
2.4 General equilibrium
So far, we have derived equilibrium relationships for given states of aggregate
resources allocation, technological knowledge and labor. As for the latter,
we will assume, as a baseline, constant exogenous endowments according to
(8), above.
1Note that since in autarky the relevant technological knowledge is the domestic one
instead of the internationally available, the South’s wage premium under autarky
wH,S
wL,S












diﬀers from the one in equation (9).
7Concerning technological knowledge, its accumulation is largely driven
by both probabilities of successful R&D. Following Grossman and Helpman
(1991), the incentive to invest in R&D relies on the expected amount of prof-
its, which depend directly on the probability of own success and indirectly
on the probability of the competitors’ success. For example, the current
value that a monopolist producer of intermediate good j in the South at-






where Π is the monopolist’s instantaneous proﬁta n dr is the market interest
rate. The presence of pbN(k,j,t) in the expression comes from the consider-
ation of the expected duration of proﬁts, which for the Southern monopolist
competing in the international market depends on the probability of a suc-
cessful innovation (in the North). This example corresponds to the period
between tc and td in ﬁgure 1, above. In general, even though patents are
non-tradable internationally, trade of intermediate goods alone establishes
the interaction between R&D activities in the North and South.
Since intermediate goods are demanded by producers of ﬁnal goods in
both countries, monopolist’s proﬁts are sensitive to the size of both mar-
kets. Due to complementarity, market size is appropriately measured by the
speciﬁc labor; for instance, the proﬁts at time t of a Southern monopolist








+ HN [AN pH,N(t)]
α−1o , (12)
where MCS < 1 is the exogenous marginal cost of ﬁnal goods in the South.
The positive inﬂuence of the market size on proﬁts, and thus on R&D
incentives, contrasts with its adverse eﬀect through the increasing cost of
introducing new goods in the market, as deﬁned above in (6 and 7)-(iii):
the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates if ξ<1, implying a bias in R&D in favor of the
more abundant type of labor; whereas the two eﬀects cancel out when ξ =1
and, as a consequence, scale eﬀects are negligible and, instead, the bias
mechanism relies only on the price channel.
8The demand-side allocation of aggregate resources, between consump-
tion and savings, closes the general equilibrium determination: consumers
split the aggregate ﬁnal good into consumption and savings, which in turn
are allocated between production of intermediate goods and R&D. Thus,
savings consist of accumulation of ﬁnancial assets, with return r,i nt h e
form of ownership (non-tradable internationally) of the ﬁrms that produce
intermediate goods in monopolistic competition, which value, in turn, is de-
termined by the value of patents in use. For simplicity we consider that
consumption-savings choices are independent of individuals’ skills (low or
high) and country. Therefore, the consumption path optimally chosen by
the single representative individual is given by the Euler equation
˙ c(t)
c(t)
= θ−1 (r(t) − ρ), (13)
where θ>0 is the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
ρ>0 t h ec o n s t a n td i s c o u n tr a t eo fu t i l i t y .
The dynamic general equilibrium resulting from optimal decentralized
behavior can be described by the path of the state of both types of do-
mestic technological knowledge towards the steady state. The full solution
requires numerical methods, which we apply to describe, below, the dynam-
ics following a GPT. However, in particular, the steady-state growth rate, g∗










= θ−1 (r∗ − ρ), (14)
can be derived analytically. The steady state given by (14) implies that
technological knowledge bias and inter-country gaps are constant. Dur-
ing transition to the steady state, though, interest rates and technological
knowledge growth diﬀer between countries, since assets are non-tradable
internationally.
3T h e p a t h a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a G P T
We model the genesis of a GPT as a particular innovation in one of the
Northern ﬁnal-goods technologies that is a positive permanent shock to ex-
ogenous productivity not only of that particular technology but also of the
9entire economy. Part of the additional resources available after that shock
increase investment in R&D thereby accelerating the spread of the GPT,
ﬁrst to the other technology in the North an then to the South. During this
process the direction of technological knowledge changes, aﬀecting wage in-
equality.
3.1 Genesis and diﬀusion of a GPT
The innovation that triggers the shock in productivity arises in one of the
ﬁnal-goods technologies in the North when the respective aggregate quality
index — Qm — endogenously reaches an exogenous threshold ¯ Q. In the steady-
state path, according to (14), both Qs are growing at the same positive rate,






so that the threshold is ﬁrst reached by the H-technology in the North and
so on, as described in ﬁgure 2.
Each shock in productivity — ε>0 —, (i) aﬀects temporarily the absolute
advantage of the type of labor that complements the speciﬁc technology in
which the GPT arise and (ii), in accordance to its general purpose character,
it shifts A permanently. In line with the sequence in ﬁgure 2, the following
deﬁnitions, referring to parameters in the production function (1) are useful:
in the North:
(
ln¯ h =l nh + εi f Q L < ¯ Q 6 QH




ln¯ h =l nh + εi f Q L,S < ¯ Q 6 QH,S





lnAN if QH < ¯ Q
ln ¯ AN =l nAN + εi f Q L < ¯ Q 6 QH






lnAS if QH,S < ¯ Q
ln ¯ AS =l nAS + εi f Q L,S < ¯ Q 6 QH,S
lnAS =l n¯ AS + εi f Q L,S > ¯ Q
10Improvements in productivity at t0,w h e nQH reaches ¯ Q, release re-
sources that become partly available to investment in R&D activities di-
rected to both technologies, thereby increasing probabilities of success, which
accelerates not only QH but also QL, bringing forward t1. In turn, these
higher Qs, available internationally through trade, beneﬁt the South, also
from the outset (even before t2), through a similar mechanism: higher Qs
improve productivity, releasing resources for imitative R&D, thereby acceler-
ating domestic technological knowledge and, consequently, bringing forward
the introduction of the GPT at t2 and then t3.
We simulate the process of GPT emergence and diﬀusion using numerical
computation of transitional dynamics, with the calibration presented in the
appendix (table 1). Table 2 depicts, qualitatively, the changes in the growth
of the technological knowledge indexes over the entire period of diﬀusion of
the GPT. Starting from a steady state, with growth according to (14), the
diﬀerentiated growth rates following the new GPT depend on the phase of
the diﬀusion process.
The larger arrow in the growth of QH between t0 and t1 means that
the resources released by the improvements in productivity in the North
(¯ h>hand ¯ AN >A N) are asymmetrically allocated in R&D: due to the
temporary increase in the absolute advantage of high-skilled labor (¯ h>h ),
proﬁts of the complementary intermediate-goods producers increase more,
thereby stimulating allocation of resources to H-speciﬁcR & D ,w h i c h ,i n
turn, relatively increases the probability of successful H-speciﬁc innovations.
After t1, once the GPT spreads within the North, the temporary increase in
h vanishes, reverting the allocation bias, while more resources are released
by a new increase in overall productivity (AN > ¯ AN).
Until the GPT does not spread into the South, the correspondent ar-
rows are smaller, while asymmetry comes from the diﬀerentiated catching-
up magnitudes — the advantage of backwardness becomes relatively stronger
ﬁrst in High and then in Low technological knowledge. Then, when the GPT
spreads internationally (at t2 and t3), the diﬀerences in growth rates revert
in favor of the South, through the same type of mechanisms experienced by
the North at t0 and t1. However, growth in the North still beneﬁts from the
increases in Southern productivity: the positive eﬀect that higher demand
(by Southern ﬁnal-goods producers) for intermediate goods has on innova-
tions more than oﬀsets the business-stealing eﬀect of increased imitation.
11At the end of the process of diﬀusion of the GPT, after the transition
to the new steady state, the resulting world growth rate has been enhanced
by the successive productivity improvements. From (14) it is clear that
this higher steady-state growth rate reﬂects a higher interest rate, which
corresponds to a higher return from assets (patents in use) that have become
more valuable.
3.2 Implications on the direction of technological knowledge
and wage inequality
The diﬀerentiated changes in growth qualitatively described in table 2 result
in diﬀerentiated phases of the direction of technological knowledge following
the emergence of the GPT, as shown in ﬁgure 3.2 A tt h ee n do ft h ed i ﬀusion
process the temporarily higher absolute advantage of the technology where
the GPT ﬁrst emerges generates a permanent bias: the direction of the new
steady-state technological knowledge is H-biased relatively to the pre-GPT
steady state.
Due to complementarity of inputs in the production of ﬁnal goods, the
direction of technological knowledge, together with the changes in productiv-
ity, determines the relative demand for each type of labor and, consequently,
the relative wage in each country.
Plugging the changes in the absolute advantage of high-skilled labor —
as deﬁned in (16) — into the equilibrium equation (5), above, the level of
the high-skilled premium jumps upwards at t0 in the North and at t2 in
the South and downwards at t1 and t3. In turn, its growth, with constant












This mechanism, through which the emergence and diﬀusion of the GPT
inﬂuence intra-country wage inequality, generates the phases in ﬁgure 4.
Notably, under international trade, whereas the succession of jumps depends
on the timings of domestic diﬀusion, the growth of relative wages in the
2Recall that with free trade of intermediate goods the technological knowledge embod-
i e di ni n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d su s e di nb o t hc o u n t r i e si sQL and QH, even though the domestic
levels QL,S and QH,S are relevant for the timing of GPT adoption in the South.
12South is fully aﬀected at the time of emergence of the GPT in the North.
Since international trade equalizes the growth of relative wages, the
changes in inter-country wage inequality along the process of diﬀusion, de-
picted in ﬁgure 5, are determined only by the GPT productivity shocks
deﬁned above in (16) and (17). The transmission of those shocks to inter-
country relative wages is derived from the conjunction of equilibrium equa-
tions (2), (4) and (10): the latter shows how inter-country wage inequality
depends on the relative overall productivity (AS/AN) and on relative prices
of ﬁnal goods; (4) shows that the prices of ﬁnal goods, in turn, depend on
the threshold ﬁnal good; and, ﬁnally, (2) indicates that the threshold ﬁnal
good in each country changes with h.A t t0, for example, both high and
low-skilled relative inter-country wages are aﬀected by the increase in the
relative overall productivity in the North (AS/ ¯ AN <A S/AN)a n dt h eh i g h -
skilled relative wage is, in addition, aﬀected by the temporary increase in h
in the North.
4 Concluding remarks (preliminary)
We have simulated a process of emergence and intra and inter-country dif-
fusion of a new GPT, in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework where
growth is driven by Schumpeterian-R&D applied to intermediate goods that
complement either high or low-skilled labor in the production of ﬁnal goods.
A crucial result of this complementarity is that the direction of technological
knowledge determines the path of intra-country wage inequality. Under free
trade of intermediate goods, this result applies internationaly. In particular,
we concentrate on two stylized countries, one (North, where R&D is innova-
tive and skilled-labor is relatively abundant) more developed than the other
(South, where R&D is imitative)
The GPT is modelled as a particular innovation in the North that is
a positive permanent shock to the productivity not only of that particular
technology but also of the entire economy. Additional resources available
after that shock increase investment in R&D thereby accelerating, from the
outset, the spread of the GPT to other technologies, ﬁrst in the North an
then in the South. During the diﬀusion process the direction of technolog-
ical knowledge changes successively, aﬀecting wage inequality. If the GPT
emerges in a high-skilled technology, the relative demand for high-skilled la-
13bor increases, raising the high-skilled premium until the GPT starts spread-
ing to the other technologies.
Since under trade of intermediate goods the direction of technological
knowledge that prevails internationally is the one that results from innova-
tive R&D, the growth of relative wages in the South is fully aﬀected from
the outset (at the time of emergence of the GPT in the North), whereas
there are successive discrete changes in levels that depend on the timings of
domestic diﬀusion.
In the baseline calibration used in this preliminary version, scale eﬀects
have been eliminated in favor of the price-channel mechanism. In future
versions of this paper we will check how the operation of market-size eﬀects
inﬂuences the time of GPT diﬀusion. In addition, we intend to endogeneize
the stocks of high and low-skilled of labor, in order to analyse how, on the
one hand, human capital accumulation reacts to the GPT and, on the other
hand, the diﬀusion process is aﬀected by human capital accumulation.
5 Appendix: Baseline parameter calibration
Baseline parameter calibration follows our previous related work — Afonso
and Aguiar (2004) — and initial levels are set according to condition (8) and
to pre-GPT steady-state equilibrium.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
AN 1.50 σ 1.50 ¯ Q 1.20
AS 1.00 θ 1.05 HN 1.30
α 0.60 ρ 0.03 HS 0.45
h 1.20 ˜ QH(0) 0.79 LN 1.00
MCS 0.80 ˜ QL(0) 0.66 LS 0.55
βN 0.40 QH(0) 1.11 ε 0.10
βS 0.80 QL(0) 1.00 ξ 1.00
Table 1: Baseline parameter values and initial conditions
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Figure 1: Path of technological knowledge in intermediate good j
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Figure 2: GPT diﬀusion and domestic technological knowledge










Figure 3: Technological knowledge gap


























Figure 4: Intra-country wage inequality






























Figure 5: Inter-country wage inequality
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